

BRITISH DEFENCE POLICY FOR THE EIGHTIES

The Falklands war exposed deficiencies in defence planning, organisation and the performance of the weapons systems with which our forces were equipped which the leadership, fighting qualities and skill of all three services were not able fully to offset.

There were no contingency plans for the defence of the Falkland islands against invasion, much less their recapture after invasion and occupation by Argentine forces. The entire operation, conducted so successfully by a task force, was one of improvisation following the landing of Argentine forces on the islands which took the Government completely by surprise. In retrospect, these deficiencies may prove to have been beneficial not only for the unique experience which the Falklands episode provided, but in pointing the way to preparing for similar unexpected emergencies which might occur in the future. The logistic problems alone, provide sobering lessons in the light of our continuing world-wide commitments.

Our ships were inadequately defended, we had no airborne early warning, no tactical reconnaissance and no effective defence suppression capability. The electronic countermeasures equipment available to our sea and air forces were insufficient to prevent serious loss or damage to ships and aircraft in an environment very much less hostile than that which we must expect to encounter in the European theatre and the Atlantic in a war with the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. In-flight refuelling was totally inadequate for an operation being conducted 8000 miles from home bases, and hasty improvisations were necessary to enable aircraft to reach the operational theatre, especially our transport aircraft.

All British governments since World War II have accepted the theme that defence of the realm is the first obligation of any government. They have also accepted full collective security through the NATO alliance (the only one remaining of the three major alliances NATO, CENTO and SEATO). Without a strong and resolute NATO, the defence of these islands would be impossible and it is only in recent years that the strategic importance of the United Kingdom base has been fully recognized.

Unfortunately there are signs that disruptive elements are

at work in Britain and other European countries whose activities could seriously jeopardize the cohesion of the alliance and undermine its political will to resist the greatest threat that Europe, including the United Kingdom, has ever known.

Britain faces a dilemma in that rising costs, a declining economy and strident demands for a reduction in defence spending may compel future governments, of whatever political persuasion, to re-examine our commitments world-wide and decide new priorities based on what we can afford, rather than what we would like to have, if we are to continue to make a realistic contribution to the NATO alliance, thus ensuring the security of these islands. We must also make provision for residual colonial commitments and the security of sea lines of communication on which our economic survival depends.

Successive Defence White Papers over the years have recognized that Britain's primary defence commitment is to Europe and the NATO alliance. The Falklands war may have focused attention on commitments outside the NATO area of responsibility and even persuaded some observers that a change of emphasis from a continental defence strategy to a maritime one would be in our best interests. But a change in priorities now would have a disastrous effect on the cohesion of the alliance and therefore on the defence of the United Kingdom base. If Europe were to fall to the forces of the Soviet Union and her Warsaw Pact allies, these islands would become utterly defenceless. There is no possibility of Britain on her own being able to deter the Soviets from attack, nor of defeating such an attack at any level.

Britain's Defence Priorities

Britain's defence priorities must be:-

- (a) Europe and the NATO alliance, including the UK base.
- (b) Vital interests outside the NATO area of responsibility including sea lanes.
- (c) Residual colonial responsibilities

Our commitments to Europe and the NATO alliance and in areas outside the NATO area of responsibility are such that present resources cannot provide the kind of defences needed to meet all of them. The deficiencies in the weapons systems of all our armed forces, exposed in the Falklands war, must be corrected by the

acquisition of more modern weapons systems at considerably greater cost than had been budgeted for prior to the Falklands war. The 3% annual increase up to 1986 for our contribution to NATO, plus the added commitment to the defence of the Falklands, will not provide the improvements needed for existing land, sea and air forces in the years ahead. Something like 5% is needed now, not allowing for the inevitable rise in the cost of the Trident SLBM system to replace Polaris in the 1990s. General Bernard Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, recently estimated that all NATO countries should increase their contributions from 3% to 4% to maintain a realistic defence against possible attack by the Warsaw Pact on Western Europe.

• The Threats to Security and Stability in Europe

The threat to Europe and the United Kingdom base from the massive military power of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, which already exceeds that of the NATO alliance, is aggravated by the threat to the effectiveness of the alliance from within, by such irresponsible pronouncements as those made by the Labour Party and their socialist brethren on the continent. The peace offensive currently being waged by the Soviet Union receives ready response from the so-called peace movements in Britain and Europe which the Kremlin is not slow to exploit. The activities of CND and END now border on anarchy and subversion and should be dealt with accordingly. We will ignore these developments at our peril.

It is essential therefore, to examine British defence policy and the size and shape of the armed forces necessary to meet our priority commitments. It is equally important to ensure that we do not plan for commitments that are either unnecessary or which we could not meet from the resources available now, or likely to be available in the years ahead. We must look first at our commitment to Europe and NATO, the contributions we make now and the improvements in our armed forces necessary to maintain a realistic contribution in nuclear and conventional forces in the foreseeable future. We must then examine our commitments outside the NATO area and decide which, if any, could be reduced or discarded.

The Soviet build-up of military power, particularly in the last decade, has been dramatic. The total strength of the Warsaw Pact forces outnumbers NATO forces in almost every category of conventional, nuclear, chemical and biological warfare capability and their weapons systems in most cases are as good as any in NATO. A summary of the military balance is given in Appendix

British forces assigned to NATO fulfil four main roles:-

- (a) Defence of the United Kingdom base.
- (b) Maritime protection of the sea lanes eastern Atlantic
- (c) Ground/air defence on the central front Europe.
- (d) Contribution to NATO nuclear deterrent forces.

While it is generally accepted that Britain should maintain the ability to fulfil these roles, it is arguable that the proportion of resources allocated to each represents the best/^{use} of our resources, bearing in mind the rising costs of weapons systems and the interaction of our commitments to NATO with others outside the NATO area of responsibility.

Defence of the United Kingdom Base

It has been obvious for some time that the air defence of the United Kingdom base is inadequate in the light of expanding Soviet air power in Long-Range and Frontal Aviation, especially the introduction of modern strike and bomber aircraft such as the TU-22M Backfire, MiG-27, SU-24 and the new supersonic four jet bomber code-named Blackjack, which will enter service with Long-Range aviation in 1984. Targets in the United Kingdom, especially airfields and missile defence sites are vulnerable to conventional or nuclear attack from these aircraft. With only about 100 Lightning and Phantom interceptors, augmented by Hawk trainers armed with air-to-air missiles, it would be impossible adequately to defend a perimeter stretching from north of the Shetlands to the Channel and covering both the east and west approaches. There are wide gaps in our defences, currently aggravated by the detachment of a squadron of Phantoms to the Falklands, which will persist until 12 new Phantom aircraft are received from the United States.

The Tornado F-2 interceptor is not due to enter service until 1984 at the earliest, and 165 F-2s plus 2 squadrons of Phantoms will barely be enough to provide air defence round the clock.

The Bloodhound surface-to-air missiles transferred from Germany are more than 20 years old and should be replaced with more modern missiles for the medium and high level role. The Blindfire Rapier will provide excellent low level defence, but all airfields in the United Kingdom, British and American, should be equipped with this low-level SAM. It is questionable whether the 24 additional units on order will be sufficient to meet all needs.

The modernization programme to update the air defence ground environment system (UKADGE), long overdue, is now nearing completion and the first of the Nimrod AEW aircraft should be deployed next year. Both systems are compatible with the NATO E3A airborne early warning aircraft and with NADGE. When fully deployed, they will represent a very significant improvement to in the air defence of these islands and of the seas surrounding them. For the future, the F-2 should be equipped with the advanced medium range air-to-air missile AMRAAM to give a better interception capability at longer range. The same applies to other interceptors, and we must get away from the practice so prevalent in the past of assuming that once a weapons platform (ship, aircraft, tank etc) has been introduced into operational service, the weapons it carries remain with it for the life of the platform. We must be prepared to re-equip our weapons carrier with more advanced systems as they become available.

The air-to-air refuelling force is being improved as a result of lessons learned in the Falklands war. A Vulcan squadron is being added to the two Victor squadrons currently deployed and to be replaced eventually by 3 squadrons of VC-10s. The decision to acquire Tristar aircraft from British Airways for conversion to the freighter/tanker role, instead of DC-10s, was a mistake. The decision was not made on the relative merits of the two aircraft types since the DC-10 is superior in every way to the Tristar.

Maritime Capability

Britain maintains four squadrons of Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft which are relatively new and well equipped for the ASW role they are required to perform in support of naval operations in the eastern Atlantic. They could, of course, be deployed to give land-based air support to operations anywhere in the world where land bases are available. The Nimrods are equipped with modern nuclear and conventional weapons.

increase the submarine/maritime air capability at the expense of surface ships is at least debatable, especially in view of the types of operations outside the NATO area of responsibility which we might have to undertake, where submarines would be inappropriate and land-based air might not be available. In such emergencies surface ships with organic air support would be essential.

.Proposals to improve the defences of all types of warships based on the bitter lessons of the Falklands are to be welcomed. Any naval task force deployed on operations anywhere in the world must have available to it defences against air attack with bombs, air-to-surface missiles, sea skimming missiles and cruise missiles. This must include airborne early warning, ECM (passive and active) and anti-submarine capability. Sea Harrier aircraft need a longer range radar than the Blue Fox currently fitted to existing aircraft, and four air-to-air missiles instead of two. The fitting of the Skyflash missile to augment the AIM-9L Sidewinder missiles should be undertaken as a priority commitment.

Ships and aircraft deployed in the maritime role must be re-equipped with updated weapons at frequent intervals, but it must be acknowledged that there is a limit to what can be done with the strictly limited resources available. There is no possibility of British ships ever equaling the recently launched USS Ticonderoga which cost more than seven hundred million dollars and is said to be equipped with the most advanced surveillance and early warning systems, missile defences and electronic counter-measures. It is claimed to be capable of detecting and countering any weapon fired against it from any type of platform. But is it the ultimate in surface ship design?

Britain' Contribution to NATO Land Forces and Tactical Air Forces

Recent changes in the organization of the British army, and particularly BAOR, had nothing to do with the Falklands war. The land battle in the Falklands lasted only three weeks and produced no significant lessons that would be applicable to operations in defence of the central front in Germany.

BAOR (1st British Corps) has been reorganized into three divisions, each of three brigades instead of four divisions, each of two brigades. The army, like the navy and air force is to be reduced in strength, but as on all previous occasions when the strength of the armed forces has been reduced, we are assured that the fighting capability and efficiency of the forces will actually be enhanced. The strength of Britain's armed forces has fallen from 454,330 in 1962 to 327,600 in 1982, and is due to fall by another 20,000 in the next few years.

Consequent on the reduction of some 7000 in the regular army, the Territorial Army is to be progressively expanded from about 70,000 to 86,000 by the end of the decade. The TA will provide reinforcements for BAOR in the event of war and will be trained for this role. One infantry brigade of the regular army based in the United Kingdom will in future ^{be} equipped and trained for operations outside the NATO area. Modifications are to be made to the C-130 Hercules aircraft to provide appropriate airlift with in-flight refuelling.

Army Re-equipment Programmes

Re-equipment with new weapons will improve the fighting capability of Rhine Army over the next few years, in particular the introduction of the FH-70 field howitzer and the LAW 80 anti-armour weapon for the infantry. The TOW helicopter-borne anti-tank missile is already deployed and will be effective for some years, but the days of the wire-guided missile are coming to an end. More emphasis must now be given to 'fire and forget' anti-tank weapons with longer range, higher speed and more sophisticated guidance systems such as the Wasp or Hell-fire. The multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) already operational with the United States army will be a welcome addition to 1st British Corps, but it will not enter service until 1985.

Proposals for extending the flexible response strategy to include the ability to strike at second and third echelon targets immediately an attack is launched by the Warsaw Pact, have been accepted in principle by the members of the alliance. New high-technology weapons are available, or will become available in the

near future to provide NATO countries with a conventional war-fighting capability which would reduce reliance on nuclear weapons, and despite inferiority in numbers of men and weapons NATO forces would be in a strong position to meet and defeat any attack by Warsaw Pact forces at any level.

General Bernard Rogers (SACEUR) has strongly endorsed the new concept as has the West German Defence Minister Manfred Worner. New weapons to implement the new concept would include ballistic missiles such as Pershing 2 with conventional warheads, or smart sub-munitions such as Wasp and Skeet anti-armour weapons which seek out and destroy tanks after release from the platform which carries them to the area in which the target is located. The delivery platforms could be manned aircraft, ballistic or cruise missiles. In addition to Pershing 2, the Lockheed AXE or the Vought assault breaker T-22 missiles could fulfil the new roles. It would also be possible to utilize the first stages of the Trident missile for delivering large numbers of smart sub-munitions to priority targets in second echelon areas while defence against the initial assault by first echelon forces is in progress.

Other new weapons for delivery by manned aircraft include the British BL-755 cluster bombs, JP-233 airfield attack sub-munitions and the German MW-1 sub-munitions for the attack of airfields and armour. Delivery of these munitions involves overflying targets which will be heavily defended by SAMs and AA guns and may invite heavy attrition rates unless the aircraft are equipped with effective ECM and have defence suppression capability, which British aircraft have lacked for years. The Tornado will have an ECM pod, but there is no British defence suppression weapon system yet in sight. One or two Shrike anti-radiation missiles were used in the Falklands war but with limited effect. They were borrowed from the United States and slung on a Vulcan bomber.

BAOR almost certainly has the best trained and most professional soldiers in NATO. Their equipment is modern and efficient, but despite a modest re-equipment programme now in hand, a more enlightened approach to weapons and tactics for the future is needed. The armed forces are by nature conservative

and reluctant to accept change, to give up old, well established procedures and tried and proven weapons for something new and different. Devotion to the tank is understandable, but new, high-technology anti-tank weapons should have higher priority if NATO is to defend against the powerful forces of the Warsaw Pact, and especially its three-to-one superiority in tanks.

Rapid developments in weapons technology demand changes in tactics and more frequent reviews of the weapons needed to ensure satisfactory application of the extended flexible response strategy. Stand-off weapons with sophisticated guidance systems are available now and more are in the development stage. They must be acquired and substituted for current weapons that demand man-power for their operation, maintenance and control. In many cases we have not acquired these weapons because they are costly, yet we spend millions of pounds on out-dated equipment and weapons that are ineffective and demand increasing attention to keep them operational.

Royal Air Force Re-equipment Programmes

The lessons learned in the Falklands campaign have resulted in improvements in such areas as in-flight refuelling, the need for airborne early warning and ^{better} low level strike capability, especially where free-fall iron bombs are used. There is an urgent need to improve the penetration capability of RAF strike aircraft by the introduction of better ECM equipment for Harrier and Jaguars and even more up-to-date pods for the Buccaneers. The deployment of the Tornado GR.1 in Germany will make a very real contribution to the strike capability of NATO tactical air forces. Although able to carry a variety of ordnance its main strike weapons are iron bombs, cluster bombs and runway denial sub-munitions all of which require the aircraft to overfly the target to release its weapons and run the gauntlet of heavy and accurate defensive ground fire. Without effective ECM and defence suppression weapons, the attrition rate for these very expensive aircraft will be high. Britain has no defence suppression capability. Indeed the only effective weapons are American and the only defence suppression force is the USAF

Wild Weasel force of F-111 and F-4 aircraft some of which are deployed in NATO.

We entered the electronic warfare era years ago, yet as the Falklands war demonstrated we still do not have an answer to weapons such as sea-skimming missiles or SAM and AA defences. The United States has deployed the Shrike weapon in the defence suppression role for some years and effective means of detecting enemy radars. A new defence suppression weapon HARM (high speed anti-radar missile) has been fully tested and is in production for the United States Air Force and Navy. It is claimed to be the most advanced defence suppression weapon yet designed but it is expensive.

British Aerospace is developing a weapon called ALARM (air-launched anti-radiation missile) to meet RAF and navy requirements but it is still in the development stage and can not be deployed much before 1986. It will be cheaper than HARM but its performance characteristics are as yet unknown. The facts are that the Falklands war alerted us to the new dimension in warfare, the battle of the ether, or the electronic war, which is now as important as the physical battles that must be waged between the two major alliances on the ground, at sea and in the air. Britain is not yet in a position to wage that war.

With the introduction of the Harrier GR-5 and the full deployment of the Tornado GR-1, we must seriously consider whether it is necessary to plan for a replacement for the Jaguar GR-1 in this decade. Britain, like France, Germany and the United States should turn her attention to missiles for the delivery of smart sub-munitions against static and moving targets, especially those supporting second and third echelon forces in the Warsaw Pact countries and western military districts of the Soviet Union.

The Israeli forces demonstrated the value of remotely piloted vehicles, defence suppression, electronic warfare and the tactics for destroying SAM and AA defences as well as enemy aircraft in their brilliant attack on Syrian defences in the Bekaa valley in 1982. Yet, the NATO allies have access to even

more sophisticated weapons which, though costly, would not involve massive increases in manpower. Such weapons would greatly improve NATO's conventional war-fighting capability and reduce reliance on theatre and battlefield nuclear weapons. Recent proposals by an organization calling itself Union of Concerned Scientists, in a report entitled "No First Use", to which British military men and scientists made a contribution, include a call to NATO to improve its conventional forces, declare no first use of nuclear weapons and build field fortifications and obstacles along the East-West frontier. This Maginot Line mentality, or Berlin Wall Western style, is totally unrealistic and unacceptable.

An extension of the flexible response strategy by the provision of new weapons systems capable of destroying the Warsaw Pact second and third echelon forces and their supporting logistic, command and control organization, would/a more realistic approach to the problems facing NATO today. This would not obviate the need for theatre and battlefield nuclear weapons, which form part of the overall nuclear deterrent posture of the alliance to war at any level. To give up any part of this capability unilaterally or declare no first use of nuclear weapons in the event of an attack against the alliance by the Warsaw Pact would invite a Soviet conventional attack which NATO forces might not be able to stem by conventional means alone. Improved conventional capability based on high-technology weapons would not make the use of nuclear weapons unnecessary, but would make their use less likely. The Soviet Union will not give up her nuclear stockpile.

The claim by the study group that the Warsaw Pact does not have a conventional force superiority in Europe is erroneous. The old addage that it requires a ratio of two or three to one for a successful invasion is outdated. We did not have such an advantage in the Falklands war, on the contrary we were outnumbered by at least two to one. In the past, when manpower was the governing factor in war this may have been true, but it is not true today. Weapons with extremely sensitive sensors, computers and guidance systems have taken over many of the tasks for which manpower was formerly required.

Britain's World-wide Commitments

In addition to formal commitments under the United Nations Charter, the NATO alliance, a variety of bi-lateral and multi-lateral treaties, Britain has many residual responsibilities world-wide to existing/^{or} former colonies some of which are too small to become fully independent.

These commitments currently involve some 20,000 men deployed around the world, equipped with modern weapons for defence against an aggressor or for internal security. Hong Kong is by far the largest responsibility involving some 7000 men of all three services. These forces are not for the defence of Hong Kong against China in the old, classical colonial style, but as internal security forces to help the civil police to maintain law and order and in the control of illegal immigrants from the Chinese mainland. Our forces in Hong Kong could not stem a Chinese invasion and no one pretends that they could, but their presence is a reminder that Hong Kong is a British colony even though its days as such are numbered.

Whether the figure of 7000 is now realistic depends to some extent on the outcome of discussions currently taking place on the future of Hong Kong island and the New Territories whose lease expires in 1997. China demands that sovereignty over the whole area must revert to her, but is realistic enough to recognize the economic importance of the colony to mainland China. In the interim period up to 1997, there may not be scope for reductions in the numbers of troops based in Hong Kong, but it should be possible to ensure that a satisfactory agreement is reached which will permit the size of the garrison to be reduced and the cost of maintaining it scaled down.

The next major commitment is the Falklands, requiring some 4000 men to defend it. The Falkland islands are British territory with a British population of British descent who wish to remain that way. The recapture of the islands following an invasion by Argentine forces in 1982, demands that Britain maintains sufficient forces to prevent a recurrence of the traumatic events of April 1982 and/^{that} the strategic importance of the islands to Britain and indeed the whole NATO alliance be recognized.

The Falklands, together with South Georgia and Ascension,

in the south Atlantic form an essential link with Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, through Simonstown in South Africa, in a chain of defences protecting the Cape route and the Horn route in the event of the Panama canal being denied to the West for whatever reason.

The defence of the Falklands is a new and relatively heavy burden at a time when the economy is stretched to the limit and it is difficult to meet existing commitments. It cannot, however, be brushed aside despite the baying of unstable elements in our society. If necessary, other less essential commitments should be reduced to ensure the continuing security of the Falklands. New concepts for the defence of the islands should be explored; perhaps the arming of less sophisticated aircraft with more sophisticated air-to-air missiles such as the United States Phoenix missile which has a range of more than 100 miles and the ability to attack at least six targets simultaneously at high or low level. Modified C-130 or HS-146 aircraft so equipped might provide a better air defence than Phantoms and at much lower cost. With good airborne early warning and modern ground radars, enemy air attacks could be dealt with at long range by round-the-clock patrols if necessary.

Cyprus has 3500 British forces deployed on the island which is not British and is populated by Greek and Turkish ethnic groups who have been hostile to each other for generations. A United Nations peacekeeping force attempts to keep them apart, but neither it nor the NATO alliance, of which both Greece and Turkey are members, could prevent Turkey invading the island and effectively partitioning it between the two groups, the Turkish half being occupied by Turkish forces.

Britain acquired two sovereign bases on the island as part of the independence agreement signed in 1960, and despite violence and upheaval has maintained control of the bases which among other tasks provide support for United Nations forces. There is no realistic scenario in which Britain alone could use the bases for the conduct of operations in the Mediterranean. They would be valuable to NATO forces or to the United States engaged in operations in the Middle East, involving the rapid deployment joint task force (RDJTF).

If 3500 men are required to provide these services, the requirement should be met by NATO as a whole, or by the United States and the United Nations. It should not be a burden on the British taxpayer despite protests from those who hanker after the days of empire, who are out of touch with reality and who hinder rather than help Britain to maintain a level of armed forces sufficient to meet our priority commitments. To fulfil our obligations to those former colonies and dependencies which cannot be expected to defend themselves will involve having ready sea, land and air forces in a form of joint task force capable of being deployed at short notice to any of the oceans as necessary, or to our land-based dependencies such as Belize.

• Higher Direction of the Armed Forces

In 1982, the Government achieved a re-organization of the higher direction of the armed forces which was long overdue and which had defied the efforts of previous governments for the past twenty years. The new system should greatly improve the process of defence decision-making and has been warmly welcomed by those who have been critical of the inter-service wrangling that has been a characteristic of all previous systems. Until the new system was introduced, the Chief of Defence Staff who acted as chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee had limited authority, consequently the advice given to the Secretary of State and the Government was not always as sound as it should have been.

In the Falklands war, the Chief of Defence Staff took over the role of principal adviser to the Government on all aspects of the campaign with notable success. In September 1982, the new system was formally introduced and an office memorandum issued detailing the reorganization of the Chief of Defence Staff's central staff. Previously, the Chief of Defence Staff had neither the staff nor the authority to enable him to arbitrate on matters where there was serious disagreement between the three Chiefs of Staff on issues which affected their individual services. Inevitably a compromise was reached which the Chief of Defence Staff could present to the Secretary of State for Defence, but which often lacked conviction and was not always the best solution to the problem.

Under the new system, the Chief of Defence Staff has been given real powers in the higher direction of the armed forces, and a strong central staff to enable him to reach firm and sound decisions based on the best advice from the Chiefs of Staff and from his own independent staff, even though individual Chiefs may dissent from the final proposals to be presented to the Secretary of State.

The Chief of Defence Staff will have a Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, an Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Programmes), Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Commitments), Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Command, Control Communications and Information). The duties of the new senior staff officers have been clearly defined. The Chief of Defence Staff will continue to be the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, but with the help of his own staff will be better able to formulate a more unified view of defence requirements. He will be the principal military adviser to the Government.

Much will depend on the quality of the officers selected to fill the new posts. Foremost among the qualifications needed will be the knowledge and ability to absorb and analyse new high-technology developments in weapons design and performance, control, communications and intelligence and logistics. The Ministry of Defence will need to attract the best scientific brains in electronics, aerodynamics, missile systems and many other important defence related subjects. Zoologists, metallurgists and chemists are not best qualified to provide the scientific advice essential to sound decision-making in an ever expanding and highly complicated defence environment.

The new organization for the higher direction of the armed forces has received fulsome praise from the former Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David C. Jones, in a long article in the New York Times Magazine of 7 November 1982. General Jones severely criticizes the present American system as rigid bureaucracies, resistant to change and with single-service, deep-seated traditions breeding suspicion of each other which hampers progress and too often leads to bad decision-making.

Having discussed the problem with former Chief of Defence Staff, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Terrence Lewin, General Jones recommends that the United States should adopt the British system.

Conclusions

Britain today has a firm foundation on which to develop a new defence policy. The deficiencies exposed during the Falklands conflict are, on the whole, being made good and the revised organization for the higher direction of the armed forces should ensure that advice presented to the Secretary of State for Defence will in future be the best available.

The professionalism of our armed forces was never in doubt. The world has had yet another demonstration of how unwavering decision-making at the top, coupled with leadership, skill and determination not equalled by the armed forces of any other country in any of the conventional wars fought throughout the world since World War II, can achieve victory even in the face of overwhelming odds.

More improvements are needed in both defence planning and in shaping the size and capability of our armed forces to meet priority commitments. New weapons systems must be provided for existing weapons platforms and if NATO strategy is to be improved and made more credible during this decade, the extended flexible response strategy must be accepted by all NATO countries and the extra defence spending to implement it must be provided. This means that Britain must revise her world-wide commitments and select new priorities. There is an imperative to create forces capable of fulfilling our commitments to NATO in nuclear and conventional roles, and special rapid deployment joint task forces capable of providing assistance to those dependent territories which cannot be expected to plan for their own defence. We have already demonstrated our ability to send a task force 8000 miles from home bases and win a war against an aggressor. We may have to do it again, but at least next time we should be better prepared.

If the NATO strategy of extended flexible response is to succeed, more emphasis on conventional weapons to raise the nuclear threshold, without reducing the overall nuclear capability, will be necessary. This will involve the acquisition of a whole new

range of high-technology weapons for delivery from a variety of platforms. New sub-munitions such as Wasp and Skeet could be used to attack tank formations at ranges well beyond the FEBA and even second and third echelon forces in the Warsaw Pact countries or western military districts of the Soviet Union. Similar attacks could be launched against enemy airfields with ballistic and cruise missiles equipped with sub-munitions.

The new weapons will be expensive, but would not require any increase in manpower. A ballistic missile such as a Pershing 2 equipped with Wasp or Skeet sub-munitions could destroy tank formations at ranges up to 900 miles in a time of flight of four minutes compared to 1½ to 2 hours for a manned aircraft similarly armed. There is no effective defence against ballistic missiles yet in sight. The same criteria can be applied to heavily defended airfields. Without effective defence suppression weapons and ECM, manned aircraft attacks will become progressively more hazardous, less cost-effective and invite high attrition rates in very costly aircraft, unless stand-off missiles are used.

The army needs better anti-tank weapons in the close support role, free from the restrictions imposed by wire guidance. This should take priority over the provision of more tanks or better tanks.

These and many other improvements in our conventional forces are necessary at a time when we have acquired two new and very costly commitments in the Trident replacement for Polaris and the defence of the Falklands. We must either find more economical means of meeting these two new commitments or accept defence spending of something nearer 7% than 5%. Technology has leapt ahead in the past decade. The problem facing NATO is one of selection from a wide range of high-technology weapons systems, while reconciling national interests with efforts to achieve greater commonality and interoperability. But unless the problem can be solved, the idea of an extended flexible response strategy with less emphasis on nuclear weapons is just a dream.

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